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AbstrAct: this discussion utilises the thought of Slavoj Žižek as a departure point to consider 
the ontological emergence of technology as techne in the conceptual encounter of the abyss in 
Being. following heidegger, Žižek’s critique examines the ontical and ontological implications 
of modern science. his championing of the political cause makes the social realm essential 
for Žižek’s turn against the possible domination of a deterministic, technical, and scientific 
rationality. the problem of modern science dominating subjectivity with objectivity, i.e. the 
reduction of humanity to a biogenetic structure, calls for an opening of the deadlock of rationalist 
determinism with the facilitation of envaluing Being, lest we be cut off from intersubjectivity by 
a psychotic breakdown. it is precisely in the lack of control we have of other people, the reliance 
on others, that we come to revivify our mastery of who we are and our actions. in the Žižekian 
mode the ethical ‘ought’ is not an obstacle in the path of modern science but a guide, an epochal 
constellation of value and understanding occurring in the socio-political realm that emancipates 
itself from the naïve resignation inculcated by the deterministic causality of rationalisation. the 
aim of this paper is to explore how Žižek understands this envaluing as the ‘mythologisation of 
technology’.
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this discussion utilises the thought of Slavoj Žižek as a departure point to consider the 
ontological emergence of technology as techne in the conceptual encounter of the abyss 
in Being. Žižek is a thinker steeped in the traditions of german idealist philosophy and 
freudian psychoanalysis whose considerations of how we value our lives with, through, 
and by technology explodes into socio-political spaces shunned by the quietism of 
heideggerian philosophy and the non-political sensualism of postmodernism. martin 
heidegger provides the initial grounding for Žižek’s considerations of technology and 
modern science, particularly in his work on civilisational malaise: The Plague of  Fantasies 
(1997). technology is both promising and dangerous in the heideggerian account: 
promising in its delimiting of physical limitations and expansion of rational understanding 
and dangerous in its reduction of existence to a wholly rational and objective mode 
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unable to accommodate for traumatic disruptions. following heidegger, Žižek’s critique 
examines the ontical and ontological implications of modern science. the politicisation of 
biogenetics in Organs Without Bodies (2004) being one such example of how we can look to a 
future with a purpose even with the paradoxes of knowing the minutiae of our mortality. 
his championing of the political cause makes the social realm essential for Žižek’s turn 
against the possible domination of a deterministic, technical, and scientific rationality. 
in the presentation of the socio-political field Žižek’s discussion enters philosophical 
territory, particularly in his Tarrying with the Negative (1993). the opening engagements 
of this volume entreat us to an exploration of the cartesian cogito and the way it is 
“out-of-joint,” a break between existence and non-existence. the german philosophical 
tradition informing Žižek’s psychoanalytic approach refers to this as the problem of 
Sein (Being) and the Abgrund (abyss). Of this tradition, the philosopher friedrich von 
Schelling informs much of Žižek’s work, but Žižek only accepts Schelling up to a point 
because his idealism is effectively retroactive and in denial of its utopian project. Žižek’s 
fascination with the ‘out-of-joint’ cogito is articulated in psychoanalytic forms throughout 
his oeuvre but it is at its most ‘enjoyable’ in the revised edition of Enjoy Your Symptom! 
(2001a): descarte’s cogito ergo sum becomes “i think where enjoyment was evacuated.” 
Without disruptive lack the cogito suffers psychotic breakdown as exemplified by the 
tradgedy of robert Schuman: 
His fate was the opposite of  a standard lover caught in an unhappy love affair 
and dreaming about happy unification with his beloved—his deadlock was that 
his wishes were realized—life spared him the disappointment of  unhappy love—so 
that his position was that of  a lover united forever with his beloved and dreaming 
about some new obstacle that would make the beloved distant.
in an analogous way the problem of modern science dominating subjectivity with 
objectivity, i.e. the reduction of humanity to a biogenetic structure, calls for an opening 
of the deadlock of rationalist determinism with the facilitation of envaluing Being, lest 
we be cut off from intersubjectivity by a psychotic breakdown. it is precisely in the lack 
of control we have of other people, the reliance on others, that we come to revivify our 
mastery of who we are and our actions. in the Žižekian mode the ethical ‘ought’ is not 
an obstacle in the path of modern science but a guide, an epochal constellation of value 
and understanding occurring in the socio-political realm that emancipates itself from 
the naïve resignation inculcated by the deterministic causality of rationalisation.
the focal point of this discussion is the ‘mythologisation of technology’ in our epoch 
of modernity. Žižek’s analysis of the contemporary subject and their milieu understands 
mythologisation as the guarantee for “our horizon of meaning.” meaning as a ‘horizon’ 
emphasises the lack of control we have over the interpretation of our words and ac-
tions by other people. this lack of control is prefatory to the existence of a fundamen-
tal meaninglessness—“domain of the unexplained”—giving mythologisation its need 
to function, its raison d’être. in The Puppet and the Dwarf (2003) Žižek discerns the func-
tion of mythologisation as the projection of our imaginings, motives, and reasons into 
this ‘dark spot’ of fundamental meaninglessness. this dark spot is the abyss of freedom 
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that precedes the subject as both Self and subjectivisation. following Schelling, Žižek 
reveals a sense of awe accompanying the understanding of ourselves as a Self: our self-
understanding. this awe is derived from our apparent existence as self-understanding 
subjects in the midst of aeons of non-existence, as though to be a Self is to paradoxically 
gain a distance from existence and become aware of our fleeting selfhood, our being-
in-the-world. mythologisation is thus the horizon created by the convex curve of this 
existential distance, the meeting of something and nothing where the best answers seem to 
be mystical ones, i.e. christianity’s ‘creation ex nihilio’.
When we turn our gaze toward this something, toward Being, we are subjectivising 
the world experienced with our senses; coordinating the value generated by mythologi-
sation with our fantasies. Subjectivisation is the attempt to gain a purchase on this ap-
pearance, the troublesome wanting of organic life “in becoming without being,” prior to 
any demarcation of temporality—past, present, or future. Becoming unveils the abyss 
haunting the subject as the dread of death/finitude in the establishment of temporal-
ity, i.e. whether or not doing something differently in the past could have changed our 
present situation as our life ends one minute at a time.
the difference between mythologisation and the fantasisation emphasised by Žižek 
is effectively the difference between ‘demand’ and ‘need’ in the psychoanalytic clinic. 
Within psychoanalytic theory, demand functions at the level of fantasy, a coordination 
of our relations with other people in their symbolic constitution—Otherness. need, on 
the other hand, operates with mythologisation, the very organic want of a raison d’être to 
offset the vacuum of an existence without purpose. While fantasy may coordinate the 
value of mythologisation, it does not consume it entirely because it is interrupted by the 
fundamental difference between the modality of ontical demand and ontological need. 
the pivot-point of this turn from ontical demand to ontological need is the laca-
nian real or ‘thing-in-itself ’; the very blind spot or antinomian stain of the subject on 
the screen of perception. the subject as thing-in-itself presents us with its antinomy be-
tween the exteriority of ontical demands and the horizonality of ontological need: it is 
simultaneously the impossibility of seeing our Self seeing and the interminable processes 
of perception (perceiving, mythologising, doubting, etc) or willing. Such an antinomy 
is a stain on the otherwise explainable and ordered reality of reason. the term ‘stain’ 
is here used to emphasise the unsettling disjunction between, to figure along the lines 
of Žižek’s discussion of alain Badiou in Think Again (2004), “the pure multiplicity that 
beings present insofar as they belong to a situation … and their re-presentation accord-
ing to the prevailing state of that situation.” for Žižek the real has two sides, “that of 
purification and that of subtraction,” that offer some hint as to the limits of the modality 
of the ontical and ontological. 
On the one hand, the Self is isolated in the purification of the real. here self-un-
derstanding is led to the mystical brink of transcendental Selfhood and is blocked from 
outright mysticism by the opacity of the real, its ‘teflon-coating’ against mythologisa-
tion. the ontological priority of this is emphasised even at the basic level of physical 
need wherein the process of satiation is thwarted by the antithesis contained in its com-
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portment: lack. 
the other side of the real, subtraction, removes “all determinate content, and then 
tries to establish a minimal difference between this Void and an element that functions 
as its stand-in.” the removal of ‘determinate content’ suspends what we perceive as the 
normal run of things in the universe (causal necessity) requiring non-existence become 
the minimal difference or ‘empty set’ that has no place within the physics of the cosmos, 
i.e. the surplus of possibility lost when something happens. alenka Zupančič observes a 
similar case with kasimir malevich’s painting White Square On White Background; the way 
a minimal difference “enables us to see ‘white on white’.” in the work of both Zupančič 
and Žižek, thanatos phobia and abyssal freedom function as the elements standing-
in for the abyss/Void that are, by virtue of their mediator status, different from the 
abyss. 
in an analogous way we can observe that the stain of surplus possibility is different 
to the ‘possibility’ of determinism. herein surplus possibility retroactively emphasises 
the groundlessness of existence, the abyss of freedom. We come dangerously close to 
the aphasic’s absence of overt (spoken) purpose if we do not observe the dread of death 
in the face of abyssal freedom. With Zupančič, to not suffer is to err in the art of living 
by forgetting the existence of a subject “always presupposes negativity or nothingness.” 
Žižek suggests this allows us “to become ‘passionately attached’ to some cause—be it 
love, art, knowledge or politics—for which we are ready to risk everything.” 
it is arthur Schopenhauer, however, who remarks of such abyssal freedom that it 
must not be “determined by grounds.” the stand-in freedom—a spectral surplus—is 
“determined by nothing at all,” it is groundless and ghostly. thanatos phobia and abyss-
al freedom appear as spectres haunting the horizon of meaning vis-à-vis phenomenal 
representations of the abyss, omens of its dangerous contingent reliance on the mean-
ing-thwarting groundlessness of the abyss and the suffering inculcated therein. as Žižek 
reveals of the work of Badiou, there is a gap between the situated subject with their mul-
titude of possible courses of action and the subject of the situation whose representation 
by the parameters of the situation limits this possibility itself. hence the opposite of one 
appears as a spectre to the other: the situated subject experiences the abyss of freedom, 
the subject represented in their situation opens onto the dread of there being no surplus 
possibility. yet the haunting of these miserable spectres around this pivotal lacuna also 
promises to excite humanity. 
following the indic wisdom of the Upanishads (1965), Schopenhauer reveals the fear 
of the abyss—in both its dread of finitude and anxiety to act—to be something constitu-
tive to the well-being of the Self. cyclically passing through the abyss, reducing the Self 
to its infinitesimal kernel of ‘is-ness’ and then bursting forth with the apprehension of 
existence in its totality as Being, revivifies the Self in its dare to exist/act and overcomes 
the restrictive phobic response. in the darkest nihilistic hour of reduction to the ontical 
‘is’ Schopenhauer reveals the promise of change and order, of reaction and revitalisa-
tion. in the stupor of ontical existence it is the intellect—a type of self-relating negativity 
(fichte), a la the real—that switches from the danger of complete annihilation to the 
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promise of something. this ‘something’ is the choice of existence in the groundlessness 
of existing; we do not shed our treasured kernel of ‘is’. here Schopenhauer is following 
kantian spontaneity, “reasons ultimately count only insofar as i “incorporate” them, 
“accept them as mine”.” 
human existence errs by choosing to exist in the cycle of perpetual need, today ex-
emplified by “hedonism combining [sic] pleasure with constraint … the very thing that 
causes damage should already be the remedy.” this immediate coincidence of oppo-
sites is erroneous and unstable because of the human condition’s susceptibility to misery. 
to build on the earlier discussion of desire and need, even at the highpoint of attaining 
what one desires we become dissatisfied: 
As soon as they are attained, they no longer look the same, and so are soon 
forgotten, become antiquated, and are really, although not admittedly, always laid 
aside as vanished illusions. 
here it becomes clear that Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are an attempt to negotiate our 
existence through a process of endlessly breaking the mâyâ, the illusion, we construct for 
ourselves against the horror of having nothing to will/mythologise in the meaningless 
real kernel of the Self that we refuse to give up to the abyss/Void simply because we 
exist.
the philosophico-mystical endless return to Being is a return of thought to existence 
in its existing (ontology), and yields the impossible question of ‘why something rather than 
nothing?’ reading heidegger’s philosophy in The Ticklish Subject (1999) Žižek considers 
this question unanswerable because in contemplating Being and the abyss we are think-
ing through the sui generis origins of what we call ‘reality’, the horizon or limit of the con-
ditions of possibility. While Being is the ‘order of the cosmos’ (the existence of objects to 
be thought and thinking itself), in gödel’s mathematical theory the abyss is the empty 
set that must be counted before counting can begin. to put this in Žižek’s favoured la-
canese: Being is the imaginary register in its ontological dimension that excites mean-
ing, and the Symbolic Order in its ontical appearance of causal necessity. the abyss 
qua real is “on the side of virtuality” against the ‘real reality’ (causality) presented by the 
Order of the Symbolic, further emphasising its spectral mediation by dread and anxiety. 
thus the abyss clears a space in reality to allow something to appear (be symbolically 
recognised) and be mythologised with a name, while at the same time thwarting the suf-
ficiency of this mythologisation and ensuring the changing world that manifests before 
us. Or to put it another way, Žižek is suggesting that we can never really satisfy desire 
in-itself because our relation to it is one of self-conscious reflection; we always already 
desire, there is no choice to cease the decay and dissatisfaction categorised by the abyss 
in Being. One might even go so far as to say that the abyss is the ‘bone in the throat’ 
of Being marking mythologisation as a vain procedure that is inevitable in lieu of the 
forced choice of existing-in-the-world.
heideggerian philosophy considers science to be an essential mode of existing-in-
the-world, or, Dasein. this position allows for the philosophical acceptance of the life-en-
riching potential of the products of science, of ‘letting be’ so truth can ‘take place’ rather 
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than be obscured by mechanical reproduction and fabrication. it also allows for the se-
rious consideration of science as a critical project in and for modernity following rous-
seau’s considerations of the arts and sciences; in the very sense that we cannot return 
to a mythic natural harmony by simply ceasing technological development because we 
are entwined with the technological development constitutive of our historical situation. 
Science as a mode of Dasein grants it a place within the conditions limiting the possibili-
ties of how we make our lives meaningful, how we mythologise the world. 
according to heidegger, modern science attempts to negate the abyss in attempting 
to ‘explain away’ and rationalise the universe, therein closing upon the unexplained. 
technology enables science to proceed with its project of practical understanding by 
facilitating experimentation. the content of scientific judgement is technologically de-
rived, and therein scientific advancement becomes coextensive with technological ad-
vancement in heidegger’s critique. crucial to this critique is the historical-etymological 
argument that the term ‘technology’ derives of the greek ‘techne’, a coming together of 
‘crafting’ and ‘making’. fusing ‘crafting’ and ‘making’ the concept of techne successfully 
connects the raison d’être of being human with the processes of being/existing-in-the-
world or, to use heidegger’s term, Dasein. heidegger considers thinking a form of techne, 
with the important qualification that “thinking is the thinking of Being.” Within Being 
technological advancement affects the human condition through the senses and through 
thought. therefore it is not only technological engagements that are changed with sci-
entific development but our social and political experiences also, “for there is no such 
thing as a man who exists singly and solely on his own.” heidegger ominously refers to 
this as “the sway” of techne and its modern effect as a ‘setting-upon nature’ that enframes 
our understanding of our human condition. this enframing carries over the scientific 
demand for objectivity to the other modes of living our lives, and encroaches on ter-
rain usually expressed as subjective. for instance, the experience of pain is measured 
and resolved through an external prosthesis such as analgesia rather than incorporat-
ing this feature of experience into the basis of our daily lives, for improving ourselves as 
the Stoic philosophy of Seneca—much admired by Schopenhauer—would have us do. 
Techne closes on ontology in the comportment of modern science, tasking mythologisa-
tion to literally make sense of the ontical world. the danger of techne is thus the fall into 
the vicissitude of excessive rationalisation because we are tyrannised by the naïve com-
fort given by the accumulation of facts in scientific research and experimentation. ra-
tionalisation mirrors the forced choice of existence in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, it is 
a species of mythologisation peculiar to the scientific mode; a ‘mythologisation of tech-
nology’ covering over the unconscious limit of the known—the “unknown knowns.”
it is ‘modern science’ that concerns heidegger because it appears to spill beyond the 
boundaries of its essence, rendering it meaningless and infecting mythologisation with a 
degree of impotence. With heidegger, Žižek emphasises this impotence of mythos in the 
psychologism of ‘ego psychology’: the rationalisation of all the fantasies (organisations 
of sense-value apropos of mythologisation) we project into the abyss, and the further 
categorisation of these fantasies as ‘knowable’ within the cold light of reason where 
cOSmOS and hiStOry256
no unexplainable mystery can abide and the psyche becomes a pathogen against the 
background of a given/determined external reality. Such a delimiting and ‘explaining-
away’ of the world has a two-fold consequence. formerly, modern science impinges on 
the other modes of Dasein, i.e. poetry and religion, and troubles the existential project of 
Dasein coming-to-grips with the abyss and Being by over-determining reason and dom-
inating the horizon of meaning, wrongly reducing the many modes of existence to a mode 
that cannot admit the domain of the unexplained in its ambiguity—the way a neurotic 
is frozen by the uncertainty of whether their act will be successful, or the obsessive’s de-
ferral of life itself. Substantively, this movement beyond the essence securing the hori-
zon of meaning of modern science within Dasein produces a metaphysical nihilism typi-
fied by “man, investigating, observing, pursuing [sic] nature as an object of research, 
until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.” Standing-
reserve, Bestand, falsely traverses the dreaded abyss reducing Being to a mechanism that 
functions per the phobic response: ordering objects to be at hand to shield the subject 
from the feared thing of the mechanistically repressed phobia. yet these objects are des-
tined to collapse into objectlessness because blindly traversing the abyss with ‘demysti-
fying’ mythologisation ensures techne closes on the ontological horizon of meaning with 
the deadlock of subjectivity and objectivity. the phobia thus appears inescapable and 
mitigating everyday ontical existence. 
herein the abyss and Being reappear as an objective trauma to the subject’s world-
liness because the abyss and Being hold a non-subjective non-objective categorical po-
sition. the dilemma of modern science and the human condition is therefore how to 
experience “the call of a more primal truth” when faced by the danger of techne as a 
challenge to the eidos—idea attained with experience (Plato)—of the human by bloating 
the value of mundane everydayness. this is especially problematic to the vital ancient 
greek underpinning of heidegger’s account of worldliness in Being And Time (1996) be-
cause “eidos-morphe-hyle, afterall, come from techne,” effectively making the human con-
dition and its socio-historical metamorphoses a ward of techne. thus the challenge to the 
eidos of humanity, e.g. the reduction of the social phenomena to statistics, is a violence 
of techne against itself.
taken in light of the mythologisation of technology, the eidos of the human condition 
is the conception of the experience of being human as we negotiate our mundane every-
day lives within a particular epoch or historical situation. ‘Eidos’ is a blending of the ‘is’ 
and ‘mythologisation’, of gaining a self-understanding within our epoch by using its out-
ward representation of humanity and imagining the barrier of our contingent existence 
as well as transcending this contingent boundary, of being part of the many. an epoch 
is defined by its beliefs and practices, the historical situation that configures the limits 
of existing possibility, the understanding of these boundaries, and their transcendence. 
epochs also carry the spectre of value (mythologisation), ordering the different ways one 
can live their life and therein making some methods qualitatively better than others. 
the ordering of the beliefs and practices of an epoch known as its technics, and the 
genealogical locus of modern science emerges from such a thing. We can locate the 
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initial arbitrary grounding of the technics of the epoch of modernity in the tradition of 
Western philosophy; specifically in rene descartes’ meditations on existence leading 
to the cogito and radical doubt, and francis Bacon’s treatises on scientific method and 
knowledge production which propound ideas of progress and a progressive understand-
ing of accumulated information/knowledge. in both these cases the ‘epoch’ notion must 
presuppose a self-making energy, autopoesis, animating the ways of living within the tech-
nics of an epoch. this energy is sublimated to fit within the epochal moment and its tech-
nics. Žižek openly states of such sublimation that its central abyss/Void, “seems to be 
increasingly under threat; what is threatened is the very gap between the empty Place 
and the (positive) element filling it in.” the (‘sacred’) ontological difference between the 
open ontology of the ‘horizon of meaning’ instated by mythologisation and the ontical 
‘objects of technology’—what technology facilitates and the technology itself—is threat-
ening to collapse from the impact of techne’s violence against itself. already we have 
self-replicating robots, replacing the ‘humanity’ ernst Jünger relied on in his analysis 
of machines in the first World War where authenticity derived of seeing oneself as an 
‘objectification of reality’ wherein the human becomes a prosthetic extension of deter-
minism with input from a nature-machine. With the eidos of humanity thus endangered 
sublimation becomes the promise of an open universe that still has its mysteries. 
as in freud’s metapsychology, sublimation goes beyond the borders of the human 
subject whilst being included in the human condition—the philosophical understanding of 
humanity in technics. Sublimation is the process of internalising unpleasant outcomes so 
we can find socially acceptable satisfaction for autopoetic energy. Such internalisation 
and redirection appears in the disjuncture between the eidos of human condition, or Self, 
and the personal sense of ownership over our experience as subjects of perception, or 
subjectivisation. the sublimation of autopoesis becomes distinguishable after experience 
takes place; the ‘wisdom of hindsight’ reveals a process of mediation between what we 
want to ideally be and our place within social networks and so forth, our ‘worldliness’. 
Sublimation is therefore always in a relation to what is, to Being, and finds its counter-
point in the turning back of consciousness on itself as critical self-consciousness. Žižek’s 
discussions of the cartesian cogito, the minimal difference of Self (an ‘out of joint’ self-
critical ‘i’), in Tarrying With The Negative makes it clear that critical self-consciousness 
unearths sublimation initially through the contemplation of  mythologisation and the phantas-
magoria of  value enacted therein, and successively in the doubt of  this mythologised ‘fabula mun-
di’—fabulous world—and then in the radical doubt of  doubting this doubt itself  (descartes). 
the space between Being and critical self-consciousness is thus the minimal difference 
of the abyss which is inherent to consciousness and our understanding of (coming-to-
grips with) any object or idea. Without such a distancing effect the abyss would act as a 
Void blotting out all contemplation of what ‘is’ and manifesting as an ontological apha-
sia—the horrifying vacuum of an existence without a purpose.
responding to the danger of the abyss, mythologisation and fantasy create and in-
stantiate an intangible world of value—phantasmagoria. When we fantasise we engage 
in an ‘imaginary identification’ with our epoch; we pour coordinated (fantasised) mean-
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ing/myth into the abyss. Such identification is the motion Bestand attempts to capitalise 
upon to similarly offset the dread and anxiety of the unexplained. imaginary identifica-
tion is the solipsistic procedure of autopoesis acting for-itself, and as such defunctionalises 
and alienates the Self so the capacity to fill the abyss can become actualised. that is to 
say, while the dread of thanatos phobia maintains a position in grounding the subject 
for existing-in-the-world (Dasein), it can be falsely traversed and covered up by represen-
tation. Žižek explains Badiou’s “mieux vaut un désastre qu’un désêtre [better a disaster than a 
lack of being]” in this way: 
Better the worst Stalinist terror than the most liberal capitalist democracy. Of  
course, the moment one compares the positive content of  the two, welfare-
state capitalist democracy is incomparably better—what redeems Stalinist 
‘totalitarianism’ is the formal aspect, the space it opens up.
to be grounded in Dasein is not to attain certitude but to realise the abyss and its func-
tion in the ideation of the human condition.
the reflex of imaginary identification is symbolic identification. imaginary identi-
fication alienates subjectivisation and creates the fantasy of a once stable self-conscious 
past. this fantasisation orders the value already introduced to the perceived world by 
mythologisation to co-ordinate the desire or metonymic ‘stand-in’ of the Other (cause) 
sustaining the comportment of the subject—it literally “teaches us how to desire.” Sym-
bolic identification traverses fantasy’s alienation to reveal the nihilism hidden in its nor-
mativity, i.e. the egalitarian right of every citizen to vote in the ideological discourse of 
welfare-state capitalist democracy does not emancipate denizens living and working 
in such a nation-state. this nihilism is propounded by the inescapability of the abyss. 
When the abyss is blindly traversed by Bestand we find the horror of something resist-
ing mythologisation/symbolisation as an external trauma which we have no control 
over—‘trauma’ becomes one of the names of the real. When migrant workers in the 
netherlands maintain their beliefs, practices, and language without heeding the tenets 
or learning the language of the country they are in it stirs the liberal-democratic egali-
tarian sensibility into a state of confused denial. Bestand functions as a mirror for the 
abyss, its objectlessness co-opts the raison d’être of the human condition. herein demo-
cratic citizenship becomes synonymous with a way of mythologising ‘the human’ that 
shifts from merely being another metaphor for the subject to metonymically standing-in 
for the subject—access to the ‘is’ becomes invalidated. the mirrored abyss condenses 
the effect of nihilism on mythologisation, magnifying the fundamental thwarting of suf-
ficiency by the abyss proper which is veiled by the Bestand of techne, and swallows the 
meaning of citizen/denizen into nothingness.
Because of its pre-ontological position the abyss is unavoidable. it follows then that 
if Dasein (being-there) retains an ontological position that affords us a ‘horizon of mean-
ing’ it must unfold within the abyss. the horizon of meaning stands in the gap between 
the pre-ontological abyss of freedom and the particular ontic content of everyday life—
the objects Bestand reduces to objectlessness. in this way mythologised value becomes 
ontologised and spectral, inviting groundlessness.
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it is at the level of mythologisation in the ontic content of our daily lives (i.e. every-
day activities like working, eating, sleeping, etc) that the groundlessness of Dasein mani-
fests. following Seneca, Schopenhauer, and Žižek, we cope with this uncertainty of how 
to act by sublimating autopoetic energy in the attempt to establish an impossible home-
ostasis; to find a sufficient ground for existing, for our raison d’être. as Žižek notes apropos 
of freud’s The Interpretation of  Dreams (1976) the latent content constructed by mythologi-
sation, the value we sense in the world, is brought together after sublimation has intro-
duced the ‘essence’ as a really existing distortion to the understanding of beings, of what 
exists; therefore giving meaning and sense a deficit of sufficiency. for instance the blue-
ness of blue—the Being of blue—distorts the eidetic appearance/dwelling of blue. that 
is to say, there is a difference between the existence of an existant (a thing), the qualities 
attributed to it (morphology) through the relations of its situated worldliness (hyle), and 
the mediation between these ontological and ontical horizons respectively (eidos). in its 
worldliness colour is reduced to a relative relation because blue-in-itself punctures the 
sufficiency of relativism with the limit of symbolisation, an ontological lack in its very 
founding: the call to mythologise. this dissatisfaction with eidetic appearance (the con-
gruent idea of something within an historical epoch) keeps relativism functioning, keeps 
imagination from becoming transcendentalised, and also keeps open the possibility for 
change and metamorphosis.
the angst-inducing danger of this fundamental dissatisfaction/lack incites a cov-
ering over of what is in us more than ourselves, the very locus of existing in and with 
Being. Schopenhauer locates this locus as the thing-in-itself, most closely represented 
as the will of the human creature that affords us both the freedom to act against our 
inclinations and the ability to remain in service of the perpetual dissatisfied cycle of 
animalic desire. in lieu of heidegger’s critique of modern science the disjuncture be-
tween Self and subjectivisation in our epoch of modern scientific-technological civilisa-
tion must attempt to resolve the objectlessness of Bestand as a response to the thanatos 
phobia inculcated by this lack. Objectlessness does not provide the strength of spirit we 
need to master our freedom. leaving this lack covered will manifest un-mythologisable 
trauma, as was made painfully obvious by the mystic/melancholic resistance of villagers 
to return to their destroyed island homes in the wake of the asian tsunami on the 26th 
of december, 2004. recourse to the covering over of the abyss endangers freedom and 
reduces humanity to inescapable servitude, mere automata devoid of Self.
in a socio-political frame the danger of the abyss for democracies is to let irration-
al dread dominate our democratic ideology and weaken the very spirit of the people, 
Volkgeist, this ideology relies on. as rousseau and others have shown, when a society is 
weakened enough social psychosis will intervene because we cannot return to a natu-
ral state of harmony as such harmony is itself a myth we create to protect ourselves from 
the abyss. Without the anxiety of the abyss democracy forgets the essence of freedom 
and can but wither until its state of affairs becomes so symbolically deficient it collaps-
es into a psychosis of alienated mythologisation lacking causality (tyranny), even after 
sublimation—the high rate of return to office for a ruling party from democratic elec-
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tions held during wartime. While alienated mythologisation (autopoesis acting for-itself) 
introduces an incredibly energetic phantasmagoria for the psychoses, it lacks the points 
of understanding to allow successful social interaction. Žižek articulates this danger as 
the very societal mass or demos of democracy losing its promise of political communica-
tion, slipping into totalitarianism or mere formal legalism such that ‘democracy’ means 
“whatever electoral manipulation takes place, every political agent will unconditionally 
respect the results,” as in the uS presidential elections of 2000 where “a couple of hun-
dred florida votes decided who would be President.” 
it is against this pathology that the possibility of automata can be therapeutically 
asserted by modern science. for example, if the successful function and structure of 
democracy can be ascertained then the justified method of social stability is to put 
this structure in place and keep it fully functional—utopian democracy. at this point 
modern science reveals its ahistorical turn, “the way in which human being is” is sepa-
rated from “the historical context of its development” by the objectlessness of Bestand. 
to continue with the previous example, the function and structure of democracy is 
separated from its historical situation (epoch) and immanent development (technics) by 
the utopian assertion that democracy can be imposed on any social situation that is not 
democratic. the idea that such an imposition on a nation-state is progressive leads to the 
absurdity of determinism; that one can accurately determine a nation, a people’s future 
or ontological horizon whether they take up democracy or not.
the inherent determinism of automation-as-therapy reveals the double possibility 
of science as a mode of Dasein: uncovering human societies as automata of the nature-
machine or covering over the abyss of freedom, the incursion of chaotic anxiety, with 
the fantasy of a possible return to pre-industrial societies’ mythical harmony. following 
Žižek’s reading of heidegger, this double possibility is asserted within the frame of tech-
nics linking Dasein and the epochal moment in such a way that historical context is spu-
riously made a scapegoat—a monstorous thing—plaguing the sanguine operation of 
Dasein with the meaninglessness of determinism thus rendering all sacrifice senseless and 
partial. that is to say, the Situation from which democracy emerges in a scientific-tech-
nological civilisation is a matter for historical theorisation ahead of technological ex-
perimentation. in ascertaining historical context the dominance of technological praxis 
breaks down because it has an ahistorical mode, as both Schopenhauer and foucault 
have emphasised. the hermeneutics of historical objects (the reading around their con-
tingent margins to understand the mythologised ‘why’ not merely the practical ‘how’) 
concerns us with the ontological horizon of meaning that the Bestand of modern science 
negates (according to heidegger) in favour of the forgetfulness of the ontical, the slowing 
of critical thinking by an almost bestial attention to everyday living.
modern science has a promise and a danger. it promises to lift the veil of mystery, 
what the greeks called lethe, and reveal the world as it really is: its truth or alethia. this 
promise is alluring because it is dangerous. the danger of modern science and technol-
ogy comes from their processes of revealing, or unconcealment. in the heideggerian 
mode this is understood as the pathos between dominating nature and letting nature be. 
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for millennia mystical, religious, and poetic experiences have all engaged with the latter 
through modes of contemplation, denial of self (self-abnegation), and enjoyment respec-
tively. mythologisation too lets the world take place, filtering and envaluing experience. 
modern science and technology set upon nature, manipulate it. this understanding is 
exemplified by quantum mechanics’ understanding of electrons: once these objects are 
no longer observed they cease to exist. the adage ‘seeing is believing’ has explicit worth 
here because it would appear that the representation of the electron in the algebra of 
physics is more real than reality itself. the emphasis on the filtering of reality gives re-
ality a sense of consistency. it stands to reason, then, that the mythologisation of the 
world is what makes the world bearable, because it opens reality to an understanding of 
the subjective and objective that is open. and yet mythologisation relies on there being 
something other than itself, the categorical closure of the abyss, to invigorate the purpose 
of enchanting perception and thought in today’s era of tiresome secularism, metaphysi-
cal nihilism, and anti-hermeneutic fundamentalism. in a 1947 published response to 
Jean Beaufret heidegger wondered when we would begin to think existence in its exist-
ing as Being. the question of the position and state of mythologisation today is a crucial 
step toward this thought, and further insight into the cultural and philosophical implica-
tions Žižek’s work for contemporary scientific- technological consumer societies.
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